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Abstract 
People report suggested misinformation about a previously witnessed event for 
manifold reasons, such as social pressure, lack of memory of the original aspect, or a firm 
belief to remember the misinformation from the witnessed event. In our experiments (N = 
429), which follow Loftus’s paradigm, we tried to disentangle the reasons for reporting a 
central and a peripheral piece of misinformation in a recognition task by examining (a) the 
impact a warning about possible misinformation has on the error rate, and (b) whether once 
reported misinformation was actually attributed to the witnessed event in a later source-
monitoring (SM) task. Overall, a misinformation effect was found for both items. The 
warning strongly reduced the misinformation effect, but only for the central item. In contrast, 
reports of the peripheral misinformation were correctly attributed to the misinformation 
source or, at least, ascribed to guesswork much more often than the central ones. As a 
consequence, after the SM task, the initially higher error rate for the peripheral item was even 
lower than that of the central item. Results convincingly show that the reasons for reporting 
misinformation, and correspondingly also the potential to avoid them in legal settings, 
depend on the centrality of the misinformation. 
 
Keywords: misinformation effect, centrality of misinformation, source monitoring, warning, 
eyewitness 
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Why misinformation is reported: Evidence from a warning and a source-monitoring task 
For law enforcement authorities, it is crucial that witnesses report their observations at 
a crime scene as precisely and thoroughly as possible. But testimonies can be distorted, as 
often-cited examples of far-reaching errors committed by witnesses illustrate. For example, 
witnesses have unintentionally obstructed criminal investigations by reporting, for instance in 
the Oklahoma bombing of 1995, that two people rather than one rented a truck or, in the case 
of the murder of the Swedish foreign minister Anna Lindh in2003, that the perpetrator was 
wearing a camouflage-patterned military jacket instead of a grey hooded sweatshirt (see 
Gabbert & Hope, 2013). The probability of such misreports increases under certain 
conditions. In the 1970s, Loftus and colleagues (e.g. Loftus, Miller, & Burns, 1978) 
discovered that exposing participants to misinformation about a previously witnessed event 
can impair their memory reports of the original event. Since then, this finding, which is 
generally referred to as the misinformation effect, has been replicated in many studies and 
under a range of conditions (see Chrobak & Zaragoza, 2013, Loftus, 2005, and Zaragoza, 
Belli, & Payment, 2007, for reviews). 
The misinformation effect is typically investigated with the classical three-staged 
paradigm first introduced by Loftus (e.g. Loftus, 1975; Loftus et al., 1978). Participants are 
first shown an original event such as a theft or a car accident and are later exposed to 
misleading information about that event. Finally, memory reports are assessed, in the early 
studies typically with a two-alternative forced-choice recognition test (see also Zaragoza et 
al., 2007). A misinformation effect can be demonstrated if incorrect answers increase 
significantly in a group that was exposed to misinformation compared to a control group. 
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However, such false reports1 should not be taken as a conclusive evidence of memory 
impairment or the development of false memory, because the reasons for reporting the 
suggested misinformation in a recognition task may be manifold (see e.g. Chrobak & 
Zaragoza, 2013; McCloskey & Zaragoza, 1985). For instance, participants may hold a firm 
belief that the suggested information really was part of the original event or report the 
misinformation to comply with the experimenter. Hence, the misinformation effect is 
probably best understood as a collective term that captures various reasons for false reports. 
In the past decades, substantial efforts have been undertaken to better understand the 
causes of these false reports (see e.g. Chrobak & Zaragoza, 2013, for an overview). A central 
concern is to determine the extents to which participants’ memory is actually impaired and to 
which they report the misinformation for other reasons. One promising approach to this issue 
is to examine how different manipulations affect the error rate (e.g. a warning about having 
possibly been exposed to misleading information; for reviews see Blank & Launay, 2014 and 
Echterhoff, Hirst, & Hussy, 2005). Another is to examine the effect different types of 
memory tests have on the error rate (e.g. a source-monitoring task; see e.g. Bodner, Musch, & 
Azad, 2009; Lindsay & Johnson, 1989; Zaragoza & Lane, 1994). In this article, we argue that 
combining these two approaches holds great promise for differentiating between different 
causes of false reports, which would not be possible by examining each approach separately. 
Within this combined procedure (see Figure 1 for an overview), some participants are warned 
that they may have been exposed to misinformation, whereas others are not. In addition, all 
participants solve a post-recognition source-monitoring (SM) task in which they are asked to 
                                            
1 In this article, false reports always refer to participants reporting misinformation that was 
suggested to them in the post-event information. 
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indicate the source on which their answer in the recognition task was based. Please note that 
the combination of a warning and an SM task has previously been investigated by Zaragoza 
and Lane (1994) and Higham (1998). In these studies, however, the warning was not 
manipulated between subjects and participants did not answer a recognition task before the 
SM task. The warning was used to eliminate task demands and response biases, yet both 
studies still reported a misinformation effect. 
Figure 1 
In the following, we first elaborate on different causes that may lead people to report 
misinformation in a recognition task. Next, we elucidate what a warning may contribute to 
the discrimination of these causes and finally discuss the additional benefits expected from 
the SM task. 
Reasons for False Reports in a Recognition Task 
While accomplishing a recognition task, misinformed participants find themselves in a 
range of different situations, from which many reasons for reporting misinformation may 
arise. The participants may, for instance, differ in the completeness of their memory of the 
original information, their awareness that they received contradictory information about the 
original event, their reaction to perceived social pressure or persuasion, and the depth of their 
memory retrieval. Based on the pivotal work of McCloskey and Zaragoza (1985) as well as 
on those of Belli (1989), Blank (1998, 2009), and Chrobak and Zaragoza (2013), we outline 
four different categories of reasons for false reports. Although these categories may overlap 
to some extent, thus presenting difficulties in assigning some false reports unequivocally to 
one particular category, they are suitable for our purpose. 
Deliberation 
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Deliberation (Belli, 1989) refers to instances in which participants decide to report 
misinformation although they know or at least suspect that the post-event information (PEI) 
does not correspond with their own memory of the original event.2 On the one hand, 
participants may want to comply with the substantial task demands of the recognition task 
(see e.g. Lindsay, 1990). On the other hand, they are usually motivated to answer correctly. 
In many studies, the experimenter, who participants assume is knowledgeable about the 
original event, provides the PEI. Consequently, participants presume the PEI to be consistent 
with the original event, unless they suspect an attempt at deception or are warned explicitly 
(consistency assumption, see e.g. Blank, 2009) and report the misinformation because they 
believe it to be more reliable than their own memory. For the same reason, participants are 
increasingly likely to accept a suggested item if they think the source that provided the PEI 
(e.g. another participant) has more reliable information than they do (informational influence; 
Deutsch & Gerard, 1955; e.g. Allan, Midjord, Martin, & Gabbert, 2012; Horry, Palmer, 
Sexton, & Brewer, 2012; for a recent review, see Gabbert & Hope, 2013). 
Recency Bias 
In many situations, participants do not carefully check exactly what they remember 
from the original event and/or the source from which they remember a specific piece of 
information. Depending on participants’ understanding of the situation and the task 
                                            
2 Of course it cannot be ruled out that a deliberation error evolves into a false belief (see 
below) due to imagination inflation, elaboration, or visualisation processes. For instance, 
Zaragoza and Lane (1994) found that a reactivation of the originally encoded information 
during processing the misinformation increases source misattributions. This situation may be 
similar to what happens to participants whilst answering a recognition question. 
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instructions, they may simply rely on decision criteria such as familiarity or retrieval fluency 
(see e.g. Blank, 1998; Horry, Colton, & Williamson, 2014) instead of checking their memory 
critically. This may be the case, for instance, if they a priori assume that the information 
from the original event and the PEI will be consistent, and hence see no reason to reflect on 
the source of a memory (cf. consistency assumption). 
Errors due to a recency bias are characterised by the fact that the original information 
would be available and a correct source attribution would be possible in principle. However, 
as long as participants are not motivated to use this information, the misinformation may be 
at an advantage over the original, for instance because of the misinformation’s recency (see 
e.g. Belli, Lindsay, Gales, & McCarthy, 1994). Errors due to a recency bias are related to 
deliberation insofar as both the original and the suggested information are principally 
available in both cases, and that the person reports the suggested item nonetheless. The 
crucial difference is that in the case of a recency bias participants do not realise at the time of 
the memory test that they report a piece of information they only remember from the PEI. 
Best-Guess Error 
In the cases of both deliberation and the recency bias, it is assumed that participants 
principally have some memory of the original item. However, there may be situations in 
which participants entirely lack memory of a specific detail of the original event, either 
because they never encoded it, or because they forgot it due to normal memory processes 
(McCloskey & Zaragoza, 1985; see also e.g. Belli & Loftus, 1996). This situation is 
especially likely to occur if the recognition question concerns a peripheral aspect to which 
little or no attention was paid whilst observing the original event. If participants are aware of 
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having no memory of the original information but do remember the misinformation, they 
most probably report this as it is the only information at their disposal; it is their best guess3.  
False Belief 
False beliefs describe the situation in which participants report the misinformation in 
a firm belief that it actually occurred, either with or without recollecting specific details of it. 
This category contains several different mechanisms, which have in common that the 
resulting errors cannot be prevented or undone by measures taken at the time of the memory 
test. For example, the misinformation may impair the memory of the original event, either by 
altering the original memory trace or by making it more or less inaccessible, so that 
participants mistakenly believe that they remember the suggested item from the original 
event (see e.g. Loftus, 2005). It should be noted, though, that people might commit a false 
belief error in one situation but not in another. For instance, the error might not appear if 
additional retrieval cues provide access to the original information (e.g. Frost & Weaver, 
1997) or if the participant is highly motivated. Thus, whether an error is categorised as a false 
belief to some extent depends on situational factors.  
Effects of a Post-Warning 
Evidence about the error-reducing effects of a warning given after the PEI but prior to 
the memory test (post-warning) is mixed (see e.g. Echterhoff et al., 2005). Yet the results 
                                            
3 The notion of what we describe as best guess error has previously been described by 
McCloskey and Zaragoza (1985) although the authors did not use a specific term for this type 
of error. Belli later coined the term misinformation acceptance. We did not use this term, as 
we think it is less intuitive than best guess and could erroneously be interpreted as implying 
that participants accept the misinformation against their better knowledge (cf. deliberation). 
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reported by Blank and Launay (2014) in their recent meta-analysis suggest that, on average, a 
post-warning reduces the misinformation effect to less than half of its original size, although 
it has to be noted that effect sizes varied considerably and also partly depended on the type of 
warning. Investigating the effects of post-warnings (in the following also just called warning) 
is expected to help in distinguishing between different reasons for false reports. Such 
warnings are assumed to reduce or even eliminate task demands and informational influence, 
thereby preventing deliberation errors. Furthermore, they raise participants’ motivation to 
monitor the source of information carefully, as one of the two sources, the PEI, is declared to 
be potentially unreliable, which counteracts the recency bias. By contrast, false beliefs and 
best-guess errors are expected to occur in spite of a warning. A false belief persists by 
definition, and the best-guess error persists because a participant can only benefit from a 
warning if they have at least some memory of the original item (Christiaansen & Ochalek, 
1983). As participants do not remember the original item in the case of a best-guess error, 
they might continue relying on the PEI unless they receive a very strong warning that informs 
them that every single piece of information from the PEI was incorrect (logic of opposition; 
Lindsay, 1990).  
Benefits of an Additional Source Monitoring Task 
In an SM task, participants are asked to specify the source from which they remember 
a certain piece of information, and they typically receive the following four options for an 
answer: original event only, post-event information only, both, and neither (see Lindsay & 
Johnson, 1989). Whereas in a recognition task the misinformation is solely accepted as the 
correct answer to a question about the original event, in an SM task participants have to 
misattribute the suggested information explicitly to the original event in order to commit an 
error. Hence, the SM task can be conceived as a conservative measure of the misinformation 
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effect, whereas the recognition task can be understood as a more liberal measure. Empirical 
evidence suggests that the error rate is indeed lower in an SM than in a recognition task (see 
e.g. Lindsay & Johnson, 1989; Zaragoza & Koshmider, 1989; Zaragoza & Lane, 1994).  
Somewhat differently from other studies, we used a post-recognition SM task to 
check whether those participants who gave incorrect answers in the preceding recognition 
task (i.e. who chose the misinformation) actually attribute their answers to the original event. 
As participants may simply guess when answering the recognition task (i.e. their recognition 
answer is pure guesswork), our fourth response option in the SM task was guessed (instead of 
neither). Note that guessing may also play a role in the SM task itself (Blank 1998). 
Participants may be unsure of the actual source from which they remember a piece of 
information but are obliged to select one of the four response alternatives (see also Higham, 
1998). Yet, barring those cases, participants’ answers in the SM task indicate the type of 
error. An affirmation of a false report by attributing it to the original event would be expected 
in the case of false beliefs, but not if a false report is due to a best guess. In the latter case, the 
incorrect answer will be attributed to the PEI by definition. Furthermore, false reports due to 
deliberation or the recency bias should be adjusted, too. For the former, the post-event 
information only option may inform participants that some information could have been 
contained in the PEI only, while for the latter, the SM task should inherently promote a 
thorough source monitoring. Table 1 summarises theoretical assumptions about the effects of 
a warning and participants’ answers in the SM task. The crucial point is that a warning allows 
errors due to deliberation or the recency bias to be identified, but the remaining errors can be 
differentiated into best-guess errors and false belief only by an additional SM task. 
Table 1 
This Study 
RUNNING HEAD: WHY MISINFORMATION IS REPORTED 12 
 
Overall, three experiments and one post-test were conducted to explore the potential 
of combining a warning (manipulated between subjects) and a post-recognition SM task to 
better understand the nature of false reports that occur in a recognition task (see also Figure 
1). To test this approach, participants were given misinformation on two aspects of the 
original event that differed in their centrality. This is of special interest because, although the 
misinformation effect is often found to be more pronounced for peripheral than for central 
items (Dalton & Daneman, 2006; Echterhoff, Groll, & Hirst, 2007; Heath & Erickson, 1998; 
Roos af Hjelmsäter, Granhag, Strömwall, & Memon, 2008; Roebers & McConkey, 2003; 
Shapiro, Blackford, & Chen, 2005; Wright & Stroud, 1998; but see e.g. Luna & Migueles, 
2005, and 2009), little is known about the underlying causes of this difference. 
In general, people have been found to remember central aspects of the original event 
better than peripheral ones, especially if the event is emotional (for a review, see 
Christianson, 1992). As Ibabe and Sporer (2004) argue, this finding is most likely caused by 
people directing their attention more to central than to peripheral aspects of an event. Thus, 
they can be assumed to have a weaker if any memory of peripheral aspects. On the one hand, 
this may result in a larger number of best-guess errors, because participants are aware that 
they did not pay attention to this aspect of the original event and that they rely on information 
they remember only from the PEI (McCloskey & Zaragoza, 1985; see also Dalton & 
Daneman, 2006; Roos af Hjelmsäter et al., 2008). On the other hand, however, one could also 
argue that the weak memory may foster false beliefs, as it is more difficult for the participant 
to detect a discrepancy between the original event and the PEI. As a result, people may 
readily integrate the misinformation into their memory (see e.g. Tousignant, Hall, & Loftus, 
1986). For a central item, by contrast, best-guess errors are less probable, as people are more 
likely to encode and remember the critical aspect of the original event. Yet, for instance 
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errors due to deliberation cannot be excluded with certainty. To shed light on the role of the 
different errors, we investigated two main research questions.  
First, we were interested in whether the occurrence of recognition errors differs 
between the three conditions realised in our experiments (misinformed and unwarned, 
misinformed and warned, control). More specifically, with the recognition task we examined 
(a) whether the misinformation effect found in many prior studies (see e.g. Loftus, 2005) can 
be replicated, and (b) whether the warning reduces or even eliminates the occurrence of false 
reports. Both sub-questions were analysed separately for the two items. The PEI may have a 
stronger influence in the recognition task if the suggested item is peripheral rather than 
central, because peripheral aspects of the original event are usually remembered less, and are 
thus more prone to the different kinds of errors, as for instance the best-guess error. The 
warning is expected to primarily avert deliberation or the recency bias, but to have little 
effect on false beliefs or best guesses. Thus, it is of interest to examine whether 
misinformation and a warning have different effects on a peripheral and a central item. 
Second, we tested whether the effects that we found in the recognition task persisted 
in the SM task. The SM task allows participants to revise incorrect answers in the recognition 
task either by indicating that the reported information was remembered only from the PEI or 
by acknowledging that the answer was pure guesswork. Specifically, we were interested in 
whether participants in the misinformed and warned group revised their incorrect recognition 
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answer less than those in the misinformed and unwarned group.4 This could happen because 
warned participants were already motivated to elaborate their memory retrieval (see 
Echterhoff et al., 2005), were reassured that their memory probably was the correct one, 
and/or felt less obliged to follow the demands of the experiment. Thus, while participants 
without a warning had the opportunity at this juncture to revise their false report in the SM 
task, participants with a warning might have avoided a false report from the very beginning. 
Therefore, after the additional SM task, the error rate of participants without a warning could 
be almost the same as that in the warned group. The question whether errors in the 
recognition task persist in the SM task will also be analysed separately for both the peripheral 
item and the central item. If false reports about a peripheral (compared to a central) item are 
due more to best-guess errors, false reports about the peripheral item are more likely to be 
revised in the additional SM task than false reports about the central item. Thus, the error rate 
                                            
4 Because the error rate in the SM task depended on that in the recognition task, we could not 
rule out that the recognition task and the SM task interacted in some way. Therefore, the error 
rates in the recognition task and in the SM task were not compared directly. Instead, we 
assessed the question whether misinformed participants with or without a warning benefitted 
to a similar extent from the opportunity to amend an incorrect answer indirectly by 
examining whether the relation between the two groups changed from the recognition task to 
the SM task. If participants benefit from the SM task to the same extent in both groups, the 
relative error rates will remain similar; if not, a possible effect in the recognition task may 
disappear or even be reversed in the SM task. The same applies to the question whether 
adjustments are equally likely in the peripheral and the central item. 
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for the peripheral item may be almost at the same level as that for the central item after the 
additional SM task. 
Working with only two items allowed us to provide misinformation on a very central 
item without overly arousing participants’ suspicion. As a consequence, however, data 
analyses were based on frequencies, which requires rather large samples to achieve satisfying 
power. Therefore, we ran replications with minor variations between the experiments. The 
overall analyses are reported in the result section. Detailed information on the individual 
experiments and the individual analyses can be found in the supplemental online material. 
Method 
Cover Story 
The cover story had to meet two requirements. First, for reasons of ecological validity 
it could not focus on learning or memory. Whilst observing a crime, witnesses often do not 
give their undivided attention to the critical event. They may either be distracted by their own 
feelings (e.g. fear) and thoughts (e.g. where to look for help; see also Lane, 2006) or may not 
even be aware that they have just witnessed something important. If participants have the 
expectation of a subsequent memory test, however, they might process the original event and 
the PEI in a depth that they would not be able to reach in a real-life setting. Second, we did 
not want participants to attribute the PEI to the experimenter, so as to reduce both task 
demands and the problems associated with the consistency assumption (see e.g. Blank, 1998, 
2009). 
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The experiment was announced as a study on computer-based brainstorming about 
situation-related crime prevention5. Participants were told that their brainstorming partner 
was a previous participant, and that they would be provided with information (e.g. 
suggestions for prevention measures) generated by this previous participant. They were 
further informed that their own suggestions for prevention measures would be placed at the 
disposal of a subsequent participant. The original event was presented as an example case 
video, which ostensibly was part of the information that participants received on crime 
prevention at the beginning of the study. To introduce the PEI, participants were informed 
that one aim of the study was to investigate the effects that a prior exchange of information 
between the participants has on the efficiency of brainstorming. The misinformation was 
embedded in this exchange of information. 
Materials 
Original event. In the experiments, the original event was an 80-second clip of a 
robbery filmed from a CCTV perspective. After taking money from a cash dispenser, the 
eventual victim (a man in his late twenties) was approached by one member of a group of 
three young men (perpetrator 1). Perpetrator 1 pretended that he wanted to exchange a high-
denomination note for some smaller ones. As the victim took out his wallet, perpetrator 1 
tried to snatch it but failed. Thereafter, perpetrator 1 and a second man from the group forced 
the victim towards a wall. The second man took the wallet from the victim and left the scene. 
                                            
 5 The topic of crime prevention accounted well for why a video of a robbery (original event) 
was shown. Situation-related crime prevention was chosen to prevent participants from 
focussing too narrowly on violence in general or on the behaviour of the perpetrators during 
the brainstorming, which otherwise might have promoted critical intrusions. 
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Perpetrator 1 punched the victim in the stomach, which made the victim fall to the ground, 
insulted him, and thereafter fled. The third man from the group (passive perpetrator) did not 
intervene in the incident at all and was the first to leave the scene. Two women, who had 
witnessed the whole incident, took care of the victim and called the police as soon as all the 
perpetrators had left. 
Selection of the critical items. To explore our research questions, we selected one 
peripheral and one central aspect of the original event about which participants were to be 
misinformed. Although there is no set definition, for study purposes centrality is most often 
conceptualised either in terms of an item’s importance for the event (e.g. Dalton & Daneman, 
2006; Heath & Erickson, 1998; Roos af Hjelmsäter et al., 2008) or in terms of its 
location/salience (e.g. Belli, Windschitl, McCarthy, & Winfrey, 1992; Christianson & Loftus, 
1991, cited in Ibabe & Sporer, 2004). We defined centrality in terms of an item’s importance 
for the event. The two critical aspects were selected from a pool of 22 aspects (see Table A1 
for an overview), which were later converted to the 22 memory questions used in the 
experiments. Twenty of these questions, which refer to aspects of the original event about 
which no misinformation is provided, served as our comparison items. The remaining two 
questions are the critical items, which cover the two critical aspects on which participants are 
misinformed in the PEI.  
Two pretests were run to examine whether our two critical aspects (central: how the 
victim was treated when lying on the floor; peripheral: headwear of the passive perpetrator) 
met the following two requirements. Firstly, participants should indeed consider the central 
aspect to be more important to the original event than the peripheral one. Secondly, at least 
some participants had to accept the misinformation provided about the central aspect to avoid 
floor effects with the central item. Pretest 1 assessed the perceived centrality of the 22 
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aspects. Participants (N = 13) were told that they were going to watch a video (original 
event), which would be used in a future study. This future study would examine the 
generation of ideas about how to prevent certain crimes, and the video at hand was to be 
shown as an example of such a crime. After the participants in the pretest had watched the 
video, they were asked (a) to rate the importance of the 22 aspects in the light of this 
information, and (b) to indicate how much attention they had paid to these aspects (both 7-
point Likert scales). The importance and the attention ratings were highly correlated, rs = .85, 
p < .001. Hence, the two ratings were combined into one centrality index. The central critical 
aspect (Mdn = 5.00) was rated as being significantly more central than the peripheral one 
(Mdn = 2.00), Wilcoxon test, z = 2.80, p = .005 (two-tailed), r = 0.78. Hence, the results show 
that participants indeed perceive the peripheral item to be significantly less central. A median 
split was performed on the 20 remaining aspects to create two groups of items for later 
analyses, one of them intended to be the comparison group for the central item (Mdn = 4.85; 
e.g. number of witnesses on site), the other the comparison group for the peripheral item 
(Mdn = 2.05; e.g. shoes worn by perpetrator 1). The allocation of the 22 aspects can be seen 
from Table A1. Pretest 2 (N = 22) confirmed that our second requirement (false reports also 
occurred for the central item) was met, too. In the experimental group, 45.5% of the 
participants chose the wrong answer; in the control group, this proportion was 27.3%. 
Post-event information. The misinformation on each of the two critical items was 
embedded in the alleged partner’s answers to two different questions concerning the video 
(overall about 150 words). The answers were based on actual descriptions of the original 
event gathered in another pretest (N = 14). The misinformation on the central aspect was 
introduced in a question about how the victim was treated by the perpetrators: “As the victim 
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was lying on the ground, the perpetrator kicked him in the stomach”6 (in fact, the victim was 
not touched when lying on the ground). The misinformation on the peripheral aspect was 
introduced in a question about the appearance of the passive perpetrator: “This was the guy 
with the hood pulled over his head” (in fact, he wore a woollen hat). The misinformation was 
omitted in the control condition. 
Warning. Prior to the memory test, participants in the warned group were informed 
that it was within the realms of possibility that they had been exposed to misinformation: 
“When answering the following questions, please take into account that some of the former 
participants were instructed to incorporate incorrect information into their answers in the 
information exchange.” The other groups did not receive this additional information.  
Memory test. The first part of the memory test consisted of 22 two-alternative forced-
choice recognition questions. Twenty of them related to the comparison items and two to the 
critical items. The recognition question and the two response alternatives for the central 
critical item were: What happened to the victim when he was lying on the ground? A) One of 
the active perpetrators kicked the victim in the stomach, insulted him, and ran off. B) One of 
the active perpetrators insulted the victim and ran off. The question and response alternatives 
for the peripheral item were: What did the ‘passive’ perpetrator wear on his head? A) A 
woollen hat. B) A hood. Both the 22 items and the response alternatives were presented in 
random order. For data analysis, the answers in the recognition test were coded as 
correct/incorrect. 
                                            
6 The experiments were conducted in German. Hence, all quotes correspond to our English 
translations of the original wording. 
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The second part of the memory test consisted of the SM task. For each item, 
participants first reread the recognition question and the answer they had selected (e.g. You 
were asked “What did the ‘passive’ perpetrator wear on his head?” and you answered “A 
hood”.). Subsequently, they were asked to indicate the source(s) of information on which 
their answer was based. They could choose from four alternatives: Video, Answers from the 
partner, Video and answers from the partner, and I guessed. In the SM task, an answer was 
categorised as an error only if participants chose the suggested answer in the recognition task 
and attributed this incorrect answer to the video (i.e. the SM answer was either video or video 
and answers from the partner). All other combinations of recognition and SM answers were 
understood as not potentially pointing towards the development of a false belief. 
Procedure 
Participants were tested in groups of five at most and were separated by partition 
walls. At the beginning of the study, a computer program randomly assigned participants to 
one of the conditions. All instructions were provided on the computer screen. After having 
received detailed information on the procedure of the brainstorming study, participants first 
watched the video (original event). Then, the first distractor phase (average duration of 22 
minutes) began. Participants read some information on situation-related crime prevention, 
worked through an additional temporising task, and answered four questions about the video 
they had seen and the information they had read. The questions did not allude to critical 
aspects of the video, about which misinformation was provided later. Next, participants read 
their partner’s answers to similar but not identical questions (PEI). Subsequently, they 
worked through another temporising task and completed the brainstorming, the second 
distractor phase (average duration of 14 minutes). Then, all participants read the instruction 
for the recognition task, which asked them to answer questions about the original event. They 
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were instructed: “For simplicity, imagine you were a witness of the incident you saw in the 
video (case example) and the police were going to question you about the incident.” 
Participants in the warned group received the warning that they may have been exposed to 
misinformation (see p. 18) in addition to this instruction. The recognition task was followed 
by the SM task. Finally, manipulation check questions and demographic questions were 
answered. The manipulation checks concerned questions such as how participants assessed 
their own knowledge of the incident compared to their partner’s, whether they remembered 
the warning, and whether they believed that they had been provided with information actually 
generated by a former participant (ranging from 1 not at all to 5 absolutely). Participants 
were fully debriefed and thanked for their participation. Undergraduate psychology students 
participated in exchange for partial course credit; all other students received a soft drink 
voucher and a chocolate bar. Informed consent was obtained from all participants. All 
experiments were approved by the ethical review board of our faculty (application no. 2013-
3-345853. 
Design 
 The experiments used a mixed design with a three-level between factor (misinformed 
and unwarned, misinformed and warned, control), and a two-level within factor (central and 
peripheral). In the control condition participants were neither warned nor exposed to 
misleading information. Since we worked with frequencies (error rates in both the 
recognition task and the SM task) rather than with normally distributed interval scale data, we 
tested the relevant research questions by means of chi square tests. 
Rationale for an Overall Analysis 
Experiments 2 and 3 were basically replications of Experiment 1. However, some 
minor changes from experiment to experiment enabled some additional questions to be 
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examined. Detailed information on the underlying rationales for these variations and on the 
analyses of the individual experiments are presented in the supplemental online material. 
Overall, the main findings of the experiments were similar, with some exceptions (see also 
Table B1). First, no misinformation effect was found in Experiment 1. This was due to an 
unusually high error rate in the control group, which was replicated neither in a post-test (N = 
33), which was run to collect further data for Experiment 1, nor in the following experiments. 
Second, the warning effect observed in Experiments 1 and 2 was not replicated in Experiment 
3.  
Data analyses that are based on frequencies require rather large samples to achieve 
satisfying power. Hence, the power of the individual experiments was quite low. For 
instance, a difference as large as 24% failed to reach significance in Experiment 1. The low 
power might also explain the inconsistencies in the findings. If these differences are due to 
sampling errors, it will be more interesting to focus on the overall analysis of the results so as 
to obtain a more precise estimate of the actual effects. Overall, additional analyses did not 
reveal systematic differences between the experiments (see the supplemental online material 
for further information). Therefore, we decided to report the results on the aggregated data 
from the three experiments and the post-test. 
Overall Sample 
Overall, 520 participants were tested. Of these, 91 participants had to be excluded due 
to not remembering the warning (31), problems with the video presentation (10), disturbances 
during the video presentation or major interruptions during the experiment (15)7, not 
                                            
7 For instance, four participants had to be excluded due to a fire practice, another four 
because of an interruption while they were watching the video. 
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believing at all that the information was actually generated by a former participant (25), or 
knowing the video already (10). The final groups consisted of 174 (misinformed and 
unwarned), 138 (misinformed and warned), and 117 (control group) participants. In 
Experiment 3, half of the misinformed participants worked through another type of SM task. 
Thus, the groups analysed for the additional SM task consisted of 148 (misinformed and 
unwarned), 114 (misinformed and warned), and 117 (control) participants. Mean age was M 
= 22.46 years (SD = 3.54), and 77.2% of the participants were women. Two hundred and 
twenty-nine (53.4%) participants were undergraduate psychology students; the others were 
students from other disciplines. 
Results 
Data from 429 participants were included in the statistical analyses of the recognition 
task and from 379 in those of the additional SM task. Comparisons of proportions, Cohen’s h 
(with small, medium, and large effects at 0.20, 0.50, and 0.80, respectively; Cohen, 1988), 
and Cramér’s phi (with small, medium and large effects at .10, .30, and .50, respectively; 
Cohen, 1988) were calculated by hand. The statistical software R was used to calculate 95% 
confidence intervals for the differences in proportions (R package ExactCIdiff). Please note 
that there may be rounding differences, especially for the differences calculated with the R 
package. All other statistical analyses were conducted with SPSS 21.0. Statistical tests are 
reported two-tailed, and, because of the multiple testing per research question, a Bonferroni 
correction was applied, resulting in an alpha level of .017. The critical alpha level for 
additional analyses was .006. 
An overview of the error rates for both the particular experiments and for the 
aggregated data can be found in Table B1. Table 2 gives overviews of the differences in the 
error rates between the groups, and summarises the overall findings for the two items and the 
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two measures regarding the questions whether a misinformation effect was found, whether 
the warning had an error-reducing effect, and whether the warning even eliminated the 
misinformation effect.  
Table 2 
Baseline Error 
The baseline error refers to the error rate found in the control group, i.e., when 
participants were not exposed to misinformation. In the recognition task, the baseline error 
did not significantly differ between the central item (23.9%) and the peripheral item (34.2%), 
difference = 10.3%, 95% CI [-0.01, 21.1], z = 1.74, p = .082, h = 0.30. In contrast, the error 
rate tended to be higher for the central item (23.1%) than the peripheral item (11.1%) in the 
SM task, difference = 12.0%, 95% CI [2.1, 21.1], z = -2.46, p = .014, h = -0.49. 
Recognition Task 
The chi-square test of independence conducted on the central item revealed a 
significant association between the three groups and the accuracy of the answer 
(correct/incorrect), χ2(2, N = 429) = 32.63, p < .001, ϕc = .28. Thus, column proportions of 
the different groups were compared (critical alpha level = .017). The comparisons revealed a 
significant misinformation effect, with an increase in the error rate from 23.9% (control 
group) to 56.9% (misinformed and unwarned group), z = 6.05, p < .001, h = 0.69, and a 
significant warning effect (decrease from 56.9% to 37.7%, z = 3.45, p = .001, h = 0.37). The 
difference between the misinformed and warned (37.7%) and the control group (23.9%) was 
significant, indicating that the misinformation effect was not fully eliminated by the warning, 
z = 2.41, p = .016, h = 0.30. 
The test of independence for the peripheral item was also significant, χ2(2, N = 429) = 
52.96, p < .001, ϕc = .35. A significant misinformation effect was observed (increase from 
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34.2% to 74.7%; z = 7.39, p < .001, h = 0.84), but no warning effect (decrease from 74.7% to 
68.8%; z = 1.14, p = .254, h = 0.13). The error rate was significantly higher in the 
misinformed and warned group (68.8%) than in the control group (34.2%), z = 5.88, p < .001, 
h = 0.71. 
We were additionally interested in whether the effects of the misinformation and the 
warning differed significantly between the central and the peripheral item. To this end, we 
had to compare the differences of the differences. Concerning the misinformation effect, we 
tested whether the differences in the error rates between the control group and the 
misinformed and unwarned group for the central item (difference = 33.0%) and for the 
peripheral item (difference = 40.5%) were significantly different from each other. Concerning 
the effect of the warning, we tested whether the differences in the error rates between the 
warned and the unwarned groups for the central item (difference = 19.2%) and for the 
peripheral item (difference = 5.9%) were significantly different from each other. The formula 
was adjusted to take the partial dependency of the data into account. The misinformation 
effect was not significantly stronger in the peripheral item than in the central item, difference 
of differences = 7.6%, z = 0.98, p = .328. The comparison with respect to the warning also 
failed to reach significance, difference of differences = 13.3%, z = 1.76, p = .078. 
Considering the two misinformed groups together, participants committed fewer 
errors with the central item (48.4%) than with the peripheral item (72.1%), difference = 
23.7%, 95% CI [15.9, 31.3], z = 6.24, p < .001, h = 0.49. Post-hoc statistical analyses 
revealed that this held true for the misinformed and warned group as well as the misinformed 
and unwarned group, difference = 31.2%, 95% CI [19.0, 42.6], z = 5.46, p < .001, h = 0.58 
and difference = 17.8%, 95% CI [7.8, 27.7], z = 3.57, p < .001, h = 0.41, respectively. 
Source-Monitoring Task 
RUNNING HEAD: WHY MISINFORMATION IS REPORTED 26 
 
An error in the SM task occurred if participants misattributed the misinformation they 
had reported in the recognition task either to the video or to the video and answers from the 
partner. A significant association between the groups and the central item was also observed 
in the SM task, χ2(2, N = 379) = 21.35, p < .001, ϕc = .24. The misinformation effect 
(increase from 23.1% to 49.3%; z = 4.64, p < .001, h = 0.56) and the warning effect (decrease 
from 49.3% to 30.7%; z = 3.12, p = .002, h = 0.38) both persisted. The error rate was not 
significantly higher in the misinformed and warned group (30.7%) than in the control group 
(23.1%), z = 1.31, p = .190, h = 0.17, which indicates that the misinformation effect was 
almost eliminated.  
The association remained significant for the peripheral item, too, χ2(2, N = 379) = 
12.74, p = .002, ϕc = .18. As in the recognition task, the misinformation effect was significant 
(increase from 11.1% to 29.1%; z = 3.79, p < .001, h = 0.46), whereas the warning had no 
effect (decrease from 29.1% to 24.6%; z = 0.82, p = .412, h = 0.10). The misinformation 
effect was also found in the misinformed group that was warned (increase from 11.1% to 
24.6%; z = 2.71, p = .007, h = 0.36). 
Also with the SM task, the difference of the differences for the misinformation effect 
and for the warning effect both were not significant, difference of differences = 8.3%, z = 
1.13, p = .260, and difference of differences = 14.1%, z = 1.74, p = .081, respectively. 
Finally, the error rates were compared for the central item and the peripheral item in 
the misinformed groups. As can be seen from Figure 2, the effect found in the recognition 
task was reversed in the SM task; the error rate was significantly higher in the central item 
(41.2%) than in the peripheral item (27.1%), difference = 14.1%, 95% CI [5.4, 22.3], z = -
3.45, p = 001, h = -0.31. Post-hoc analyses showed that the effect was significant in the 
misinformed and unwarned group, but not in the misinformed and warned group, difference = 
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20.3%, 95% CI [8.4, 31.9], z = -3.65, p < 001, h = -0.42, and difference = 6.1%, 95% CI [-
6.9, 17.9], z = -1.04, p = .299, h = -0.15), respectively. 
Figure 2 
SM Answers in the Warned Group  
To gain further insight into why misinformation is reported even in the warned group, 
false reports in that group were analysed more closely (see Table C1 for an overview). With 
the central item, false reports were attributed in 85.3% of all cases to the video or the video 
and the partner, in 12.2% of the cases to the partner only (correct attribution), and in 2.4% of 
the cases to pure guesswork. Concerning the peripheral item, 36.9% of all erroneous answers 
were attributed to the video or the video and the partner, 34.2% were correctly attributed to 
the partner only, and 28.9% to pure guesswork. An overview of the results and the proportion 
of the different errors can be seen in Figure 3. 
Figure 3 
Additional Analyses 
Response patterns in critical and comparison items in the control group. Working 
with only two critical items raises the important question whether these two items’ response 
patterns in the memory tests are comparable to those for other central and peripheral items of 
the original event (comparison items; see Pretest 1 and Table A1). To answer this question, 
the response patterns for the central and peripheral critical and comparison items were 
contrasted in the collapsed control conditions. As Figure D1 illustrates, the two critical items’ 
response patterns and their respective comparison items’ patterns are quite similar. 
Furthermore, it becomes clear that the patterns between the central and the peripheral items 
are fairly divergent. 
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In general, the central items have a larger proportion of correct recognition answers, 
and guesswork was rather rare, especially for the central critical item. However, in relation to 
the comparison items, the central critical item seems to be more susceptible to intrusions: 
Almost 24% of the participants in the control group indicated that a kick, which was not 
suggested to them in the PEI, had been part of the original event, compared to 11% in the 
central comparison items. In contrast, the peripheral item elicited a large number of correct 
and incorrect answers, which can be attributed to pure guesswork. Correct answers were 
somewhat more frequent in the peripheral critical item than in the comparison items, whereas 
intrusions occurred comparably often (about 12%). In general, correct recognition answers 
that were attributed to the incorrect source (e.g. to the partner, although he or she did not 
actually mention the information) occurred rarely. In sum, the response patterns for the two 
critical items seem to be quite representative of their respective groups of comparison items. 
Overall performance on the comparison items. Participants in the three groups did 
not differ in the number of correctly answered comparison items (misinformed and unwarned 
group: M = 16.30, SD = 1.95; misinformed and warned group: M = 16.17, SD = 1.87; control 
group: M = 16.21, SD = 1.92; F(2, 426) = 0.21, p = .811, partial η2 < .01). 
Discussion 
In this research, we sought to better understand the reasons why people report 
misinformation about central and peripheral aspects of an original event in a recognition task. 
Therefore, we examined what impact a warning had on the error rate in misinformed 
participants. We reasoned that a warning reduces false reports due to deliberation or the 
recency bias by encouraging participants to rely on their own memory and/or to check the 
source of their memory carefully. A post-recognition source-monitoring (SM) task provided 
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insight into participants’ motives for reporting misinformation in the recognition task and 
was assumed also to be helpful in differentiating between different types of errors. 
The Misinformation Effect in the Recognition Task 
The misinformation effect (see e.g. Loftus, 2005) was replicated in the recognition 
task for both items. The error rate in the misinformed and unwarned group was more than 
twice that in the control group, with an increase of 33% (from 24% to 57%) in the central 
item and 41% (from 34% to 75%) in the peripheral item. Contrary to other studies (e.g. 
Dalton & Daneman, 2006), but in agreement with the results reported by Luna and Migueles 
(2005, 2009), the misinformation effect was not significantly stronger for the peripheral item 
than for the central item. Of course, it is of interest to examine what the findings on the effect 
of a warning and on participants’ attributions in the SM can tell us about the underlying 
causes of the misinformation effect. 
The Effect of a Warning 
We reasoned that, if the misinformation effect observed in the unwarned group (see 
above) is to some extent due to deliberation and/or a recency bias, the effect should be 
reduced by a warning. For the central item we found a significant reduction of false reports 
because of a warning (decrease of the error rate by 19%), although the effect was not 
completely eliminated. Hence, we conclude that errors other than deliberation or the recency 
bias seem to be of little importance for the misinformation effect with respect to the central 
item. But even after a warning some people still reported the central item, that is, they 
probably developed a false belief. In contrast to the central item, we could not detect a 
significant effect of the warning for the peripheral item. Hence, deliberation and the recency 
bias seem to play only a minor role for that item.  
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One reason why errors due to deliberation and/or the recency bias affect the 
misinformation effect for the central item so much more strongly than that for the peripheral 
item may be the stronger memory trace for the central aspect of the original event. In fact, 
several of our findings lend circumstantial support to the notion that participants had a 
stronger memory trace for the central item. First, the participants in Pretest 1 reported having 
paid considerably more attention to the central aspect of the original event (Mdn = 5.00) than 
to the peripheral aspect (Mdn = 1.00). Second, more than 55% of the participants in the 
control group reported that their recognition answer relating to the peripheral item had been 
pure guesswork, whereas for the central item this applied to only 3% of the cases. Third, 
although only at a descriptive level, the participants in the control group answered the 
recognition question concerning the peripheral item incorrectly more often than that 
concerning the central item. Thus, participants capitalise on the motivation engendered by a 
warning to strive for a thorough memory search and evaluation and/or to qualify demand 
characteristics and informational influence, if they have at least some memory of the original 
event (see also Christiaansen & Ochalek, 1983). 
Insights from the Source-Monitoring Task 
 A very interesting finding was that the false recognition answers in the misinformed 
groups for the peripheral item were much more often emended in the SM task than those for 
the central item. Although the results from the recognition task suggest that the peripheral 
item (error rate of 77%) is more error prone than the central item (56%), this relation is 
inverted when the SM answers are considered (28% and 48%, respectively).  
First of all, this finding allows important conclusions with respect to the underlying 
causes of false reports of the peripheral misinformation. As mentioned earlier, a weak 
memory trace may either foster errors of false belief because participants do not detect the 
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discrepancy between their own memory and the PEI and integrate the misinformation into 
their memory of the original event (see Tousignant et al., 1986), or it may promote best-guess 
errors as participants have no memory of the original event and knowingly report the 
information from the PEI. We found that the misinformation effect was not completely 
eliminated by the SM task. This supports the idea that exposure to the peripheral piece of 
misinformation evoked false beliefs, at least to some extent. However, the marked decrease 
of the peripheral item’s error rate from over 70% (recognition task) to about 25% (SM task) 
in the misinformed groups strongly suggests that a considerable proportion of these false 
reports were due to errors other than false beliefs. The analyses of warned participants’ SM 
answers after they had reported the peripheral misinformation in the recognition task revealed 
that best-guess errors and pure guesswork were frequent causes of false reports. Hence, best-
guess errors, pure guesswork, and false beliefs contribute to a similar extent to the 
misinformation effect observed in the recognition task (see Figure 3).  
Regarding the central item, as mentioned, a strong effect of a warning was observed in 
the recognition task. Assuming that a warning and the SM task have a similar function, as we 
outlined in the introduction it follows that they both should reduce errors due to deliberation 
and the recency bias: While warned participants have already avoided these two errors in the 
recognition task, unwarned participants are expected to take the chance to emend their 
incorrect recognition answer by attributing the misinformation to their partner in the SM task. 
However, we found that the significant misinformation effect observed in the recognition task 
(56%) with the unwarned participants remained almost stable in the SM task (48%). In terms 
of our classification, this means that they developed a false belief, which is not in line with 
the pronounced effect of a warning. This conflicting result is quite surprising and raises the 
question of whether our warning and SM task are truly functionally equivalent.  
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Different Functions of the Warning and the Source-Monitoring Task 
There are several possible explanations for the different effects of the warning and the 
SM task in our experiments. On the one hand, the SM answer was assessed within subjects 
after the recognition answer. Hence, participants may have been reluctant to admit having 
guessed or relied on their partner, especially concerning such a central aspect of the original 
event. Yet it may be queried whether these needs or feelings really override the need to 
answer accurately. Alternatively, participants may actually have developed a false belief 
whilst elaborating on the recognition question. The results from Experiment 3 (see 
supplemental online material) suggest that such false beliefs do not evolve generally after 
answering a recognition question, that is, even if the question was answered correctly. Hence, 
in order to develop a false belief, participants not only have to elaborate on the question but 
must also accept the misinformation. This acceptance may be especially likely if participants 
are not warned, because a warning may help them to promptly reject the misinformation and 
thereby protects them from developing a false belief.  
On the other hand, as Chambers and Zaragoza (2001) argue, the warning may have an 
additional effect that the SM task does not have. Whilst both measures may have impelled 
participants to thoroughly monitor the source of information (see also Echterhoff et al., 
2005), only the warning may additionally have entailed a more critical consideration of the 
misinformation, which for instance may have caused a shift in the participants’ source 
decision criterion (cf. source monitoring framework; Johnson, Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993). 
That is, participants who are warned may set a higher threshold on the quality requirements 
of their memory (e.g. the memory has to include more visual/auditory details) before 
attributing it to the original event (see also Chambers & Zaragoza, 2001). In our SM task, 
participants were not explicitly instructed that some information might have occurred in the 
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PEI exclusively, which may be an explanation why no such shift occurred. However, this 
contention is undermined by the fact that Chambers and Zaragoza (2001) used an instruction 
that clearly stated that some information occurred in the PEI only and also found that an 
explicit warning in addition to the SM instruction was superior to the SM instruction only. 
Limitations and Strengths of the Study 
The assessment of the recognition and the SM tasks within participants is a major 
limitation of our study, in that the exact reasons for the different effects of the warning and 
the SM task remain unclear. However, our aim of examining the roles of different kinds of 
errors could only be achieved with a within-subject design. One solution to this problem 
could be to expand the design by also testing groups that answer only source-monitoring 
questions (e.g. akin to the SM questions introduced in Experiment 3).  
Another limitation is that the two pieces of misinformation were not presented 
randomly, which might have had an impact on the misinformation effect––especially as the 
first piece of misinformation blatantly contrasts with the original event (Loftus, 1979). 
However, if anything, systematically presenting the central misinformation first would have 
worked against our hypothesis of finding a misinformation effect with a peripheral item. 
Finally, the SM answers could not be interpreted unambiguously for two reasons. First, some 
participants may have chosen the I guessed option in the SM task because they were unsure 
of the source from which they remembered the information, and not because their answer in 
the recognition task had been pure guesswork. Second, participants might occasionally have 
guessed the answer in the SM task like flipping a coin (cf. source guessing, see e.g. Higham, 
1998). In future studies, it would be interesting to add a fifth response option (e.g. I know it 
occurred somewhere in the experiment, but I don’t know where, Higham, 1998) to the SM 
task to filter this type of guessing error. 
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A consequence of working with a central item is that we could not include many more 
items, which limits the generalisability of the results. Too many discrepancies between the 
original event and the PEI could have served as an unintended, implicit warning, as these 
discrepancies may have raised the participants’ suspicions. In general, the additional analyses 
suggest that the critical items were fairly representative for their respective comparison items. 
Yet, the central item was rather susceptible to intrusions even in the absence of 
misinformation. This may have been because the central item was not clearly incompatible 
with the original event. Although one might argue that remembering that the victim was 
kicked while lying on the floor is incompatible with remembering that he was not touched 
after he fell to the ground, participants may have reasoned that they had merely overlooked 
this very action (see also Chambers & Zaragoza, 2001). Therefore, it remains to be seen 
whether the results can be generalised to items that are clearly contradictory and/or have a 
lower general susceptibility to intrusions. Another query over generalisability is the absence 
of the warning effect in Experiment 3, which was run at the University of Kiel (Germany), 
whereas the other experiments were run at the University of Bern (Switzerland). In a post hoc 
analysis, we could not detect significant differences between the samples, for instance 
concerning the trust in their own memory or in that of their partner, that would explain the 
inconsistent finding. Thus, it remains unclear whether the inconsistency in the warning effect 
was due to sampling errors or to actual cultural differences between German and Swiss 
people, such as peculiarities in the use of language. Last but not least, the results may very 
well be different if other types of warnings, such as enlightenment (e.g. Oeberst & Blank, 
2012) or the logic of opposition (Lindsay, 1990), were used.  
Our experiments also have several strengths. Despite the difficulties associated with 
investigating central, crime-relevant items, the examination of the misinformation effect for 
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such items is crucial, as it increases the ecological validity of the studies. Real-life examples 
such as the Oklahoma bombing in 1993 or the murder of Anna Lindh in 2003 indicate that 
witnesses are also susceptible to rather central misinformation. Nonetheless, many studies 
focus on the effect that peripheral misinformation has on memory reports (see e.g. Luna & 
Migueles, 2006, cited in Luna & Migueles, 2009). Our results support the view that studying 
both types of items is vital and further improves our understanding of the mechanisms that 
underlie false reports. A methodological advantage of our studies is the use of a cover story 
that does not centre upon memory, because this avoided the possibility that participants 
watched the video with the explicit expectation of subsequent memory questions. 
Furthermore, replications were run to gain a clearer picture of the actual effects. This was 
especially important, as we analysed frequencies, which requires a substantial sample size to 
achieve a satisfying power and adequate estimates of the effects. 
Implications and Future Research 
The results clearly show that the reasons for false reports in a recognition task vary 
broadly depending on the centrality of the items, and they emphasise the importance of taking 
account of this aspect in future studies. Acquiring knowledge of the extent to which and the 
reasons why false reports have to be expected after exposure to misinformation is valuable 
for practical purposes. Depending on the causes of false reports, they can be prevented by 
certain measures (e.g. a warning or asking participants about the source of their memory). In 
the warning condition of our experiments, participants were merely informed about the 
possibility of having been exposed to incorrect information, which nonetheless strongly 
reduced the occurrence of false reports for the central item. In principle, this could also be 
done in a police interrogation. But caution should be exercised with such action, as the 
reporting of correct information may be collaterally damaged (tainted truth effect; Echterhoff 
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et al., 2007). Hence, additional research is needed to establish the potential detrimental 
effects that a warning can have before, for example, scripting an information leaflet about the 
misinformation effect in legal practice. 
Moreover, the approach presented here may be a promising starting point for further 
research which may also help to explain other findings in the field on the misinformation 
effect. For instance, the fact that the warning only reduced errors in the central item may be 
an explanation for the inconsistent findings in warning studies (see e.g. Blank & Launay, 
2014; Echterhoff et al., 2005): If the critical items used in a study are too peripheral or if 
participants did not pay enough attention to the original event for whatsoever reason, it may 
simply be not possible for them to benefit from a warning. 
It is important to test the generalisability of the results reported here to other instances 
of misinformation and to examine the role other characteristics of misinformation may play. 
But, as mentioned, the number of central items that can be researched within participants is 
limited, and it is challenging to find items that vary only with respect to their centrality but 
not in other characteristics, such as schema consistency or the general susceptibility to 
intrusions. One approach to circumventing this problem is to experimentally manipulate the 
attention participants can or do pay towards certain aspects of the original event, either 
directly by a divided attention task, or indirectly by using specific instructions or cover 
stories to direct their attention. 
Another important question is why the warning and the SM task did not have 
comparable effects. To decide whether participants actually develop a false belief or whether 
the warning causes a shift in the response threshold, some participants who are not warned 
before answering the recognition questions could be provided with an explicit warning before 
the SM task in a future study. If this warning does not have the same effect as a warning 
RUNNING HEAD: WHY MISINFORMATION IS REPORTED 37 
 
given before the recognition question, this would indicate that the elaboration on the 
recognition question may be accompanied by some processes that foster the development of 
false beliefs. 
Conclusion 
Examining the impact that misinformation on central aspects of an event has on 
people’s memory and memory reports is practically relevant, as various cases of witnesses’ 
misled testimonies illustrate. As our results emphasise, it is crucial to consider items of 
varying centrality, because the reasons for false reports differ depending on whether the 
misinformation concerns central or peripheral aspects of the original event. For instance, best 
guesses and false beliefs seem to be especially important for the peripheral item, while 
deliberation and/or the recency bias are presumably vital for the central item, although the 
inconsistent effects of the warning and the SM task impede a final conclusion with respect to 
this latter item. The results nevertheless show that the combined investigation of the effects 
of a warning and a post-recognition SM task is a promising and worthwhile approach to 
directly investigating the role of different errors in the reporting of misinformation. The 
combined investigation especially improves the identification of false beliefs, as it helps to 
filter best-guess errors, which would not be possible with a warning alone. Last but not least, 
these insights improve both the assessment of the impact that misinformation has on 
witnesses’ testimonies and our understanding of how to prevent or identify the reporting of 
misinformation. 
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Appendix A 
Table A1  
Centrality Index of the Critical and Comparison Aspects of the Original Event 
Central Aspects Centrality Index (Mdn) 
Number of witnesses at the scene 6.50 
Body height of the victim relative to the perpetrators 5.50 
Sex of the witnesses 5.50 
Threat the victim made against the perpetrators (will call the police) 5.50 
How victim was treated when lying on the ground 5.00 
Objects taken from the victim 5.00 
Language spoken by the victim 4.50 
Body area in which the victim was punched 4.00 
Place where the passive perpetrator was standing during the incident 4.00 
Location of the pocket in which the victim stored his wallet 3.00 
Type of automat/booth at the location 3.00 
Peripheral Aspects Centrality Index (Mdn) 
Number of perpetrators with headwear 2.50 
Headwear worn by the passive perpetrator 2.00 
Number of witnesses carrying a bag 2.00 
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Pocket in which perpetrator 1 put the banknote he allegedly wanted 
to change 
2.00 
Type of facial hair worn by passive perpetrator 2.00 
Colour of perpetrator 1’s coat 1.50 
Content of window display 1.50 
Head covering of the witness who knelt next to the victim 1.50 
Number of perpetrators wearing jeans 1.50 
Number of perpetrators with a scarf 1.50 
Type of shoes worn by perpetrator 1 1.50 
Note. Overview on the content and centrality index ratings from Pretest 1 (scale ranging from 
1 to 7) of the central and peripheral aspects on which participants were asked questions at the 
memory test (translated from the German original version). The two critical aspects are printed 
in bold. 
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Appendix B 
Table B1  
 
Error Rates in the Recognition Task and Remaining Errors in the Source-Monitoring Task in the Three Conditions for the Central and the 
Peripheral Item per Experiment and Overall 
 
 Misinformed and unwarned group Misinformed and warned group Control group 
 Exp. 1 Exp. 2 Exp. 3 Overall Exp. 1 Exp. 2 Exp. 3 Overall Exp. 1 Exp. 2 Exp. 3 Overall 
 Central item 
Recognition task 59.4 53.4 57.7 56.9 27.9 29.4 56.8 37.7 36.6 18.0 15.4 23.9 
SM task 48.4 48.3 53.8 49.3 25.6 25.5 55.0 30.7 36.6 18.0 11.5 23.1 
 Peripheral Item 
Recognition Task 68.8 82.8 73.1 74.7 62.8 74.5 68.2 68.8 41.5 28.0 34.6 34.2 
SM task 28.1 27.6 34.6 29.1 30.2 25.5 10.0 24.6 17.1   4.0 15.4 11.1 
 
Note. All figures represent percentages. Experiment 1 also includes the data from the posttest. 
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Appendix C 
 
Table C1 
Source Attributions of Misinformation Selected in Response to the Recognition Question 
 
Central item Peripheral item 
 
Misinformed and 
unwarned group 
Misinformed and 
warned group 
Control group 
Misinformed and 
unwarned group 
Misinformed and 
warned group 
Control group 
No of cases1 86 41 28 112 76 40 
Video only 26.7 39.0 67.9 21.4 21.1 32.5 
Video and partner 58.1 46.3 28.6 17.0 15.8 0.0 
Guess 3.5 2.4   0.0 26.8 28.9 67.5 
Partner only2 11.6 12.2   3.6 34.8 34.2 0.0 
Note. All figures represent percentages, except for the number of cases. The results refer to the overall analyses (N = 379). 1Number of 
participants who chose the misinformation response in the recognition task. 2Corresponds to a correct source attribution in the misinformed 
groups.
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Appendix D 
 
Figure D1. Response patterns for the two critical items and their respective comparison items 
in the collapsed control groups. Recognition correct and SM incorrect: The correct answer is 
attributed to the partner (PEI), although the partner did not mention this information. 
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Table 1 
Theoretical Assumptions Concerning the Effect of a Warning and the Attribution of 
Recognition Errors for the Different Types of Errors 
 
Assumed type of error Effect of warning Correction in the SM task 
   
Deliberation Yes Yes 
Recency bias Yes Yes 
Best guess No Yes 
False belief No No 
Note. For example, errors due to deliberation are expected to be reduced by a warning. 
Furthermore, if such a report occurs (e.g. because participants were not warned), the incorrect 
recognition answer should be attributed to the partner and not to the original event by 
definition. In this sense, participants correct their erroneous recognition answer. An 
additional situation not included in the table is the case of pure guesswork, in which the 
misinformation is reported but participants indicate in the SM task that they guessed. 
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Table 2 
Comparing Overall Error Rates in the Recognition Task and Remaining Errors in the SM 
Task for the Central and the Peripheral Misinformation Item in the Three Groups.  
  Central item  Peripheral item 
  
 
Effect Diff 95% CI Effect Diff 95% CI 
Recognition task         
          
 ME Yes 33.0 [21.0, 45.0] Yes 40.5 [27.7, 52.1] 
 Effect of warning Yes 19.2 [  8.2, 30.5] No 5.9 [ -4.7, 16.8] 
 Elimination of ME No 13.7 [  2.3, 25.6] No 34.7 [21.4, 47.2] 
 
SM task 
        
          
 ME Yes 26.2 [12.5, 38.6] Yes 18.0 [  7.0, 28.0] 
 Effect of warning Yes 18.6 [  3.1, 30.9] No 4.5 [ -7.5, 15.3] 
 Elimination of ME Yes 7.6 [ -5.0, 19.1] No 13.5 [  2.7, 24.7] 
Note. All figures represent percentages and refer to the overall analyses. Diff = difference 
between the two respective groups; CI = confidence interval. Effect refers to whether the data 
is supportive of the research question. ME (misinformation effect): Significant difference 
between misinformed and unwarned vs. control group. Effect of warning: Significant 
reduction of the error rate by a warning (difference between misinformed and unwarned vs. 
misinformed and warned group). Elimination of ME: Elimination of the misinformation 
effect because of a warning (difference between misinformed and warned group vs. control 
group is insignificant). 
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Figure 1. Overview of the experimental approach. *The warning was manipulated between 
subjects in the misinformed groups. **A control group was exposed neither to misinformation 
nor to a warning. 
 
Figure 2. Overall error rates in the recognition task and errors remaining in the SM task 
(incorrect answer in the recognition task and attribution to the original event) in the different 
groups. 
 
Figure 3. Error rate in the misinformed and unwarned group explained by different types of 
errors for the central and the peripheral item. False beliefs are the errors that persist even in 
the SM task, thas is, the misinformation is attributed to the video or the video and the partner. 
R = Recognition task, SM = SM task. 
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Online Supplementary Materials 
Experiment 1 
Method 
Participants. Overall, 133 participants were tested. Of these, 18 participants had to be 
excluded due to not remembering the warning (8), problems with the video presentation (3), 
or not believing at all that the information was actually generated by a former participant (7). 
The final groups consisted of 47 (misinformed and unwarned), 43 (misinformed and warned), 
and 25 (control) participants. Mean age was M = 22.36 years (SD = 7.31), and 86 participants 
were women. Sixty-seven participants were undergraduate psychology students; the others 
were students from other disciplines. 
Design. The experiment used a mixed design with a three-level between factor 
(misinformed and unwarned, misinformed and warned, control), and a two-level within 
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factor (central and peripheral).8 In the control condition participants were neither warned nor 
exposed to misleading information. The dependent variables were frequencies (error rates in 
the recognition and SM task).  
Results 
Comparisons of proportions, Cohen’s h (with small, medium, and large effects at 0.20, 
0.50, and 0.80, respectively; Cohen, 1988), and Cramér’s phi (with small, medium and large 
effects at .10, .30, and .50, respectively; Cohen, 1988) were calculated by hand. The 
                                            
8 In Experiments 1 and 2, we also manipulated the credibility of the partner with the aim of 
investigating the effects of a warning before the exposure to misinformation (prewarning) in 
combination with those of a warning after the misinformation (postwarning). Participants 
were informed that their partner had either seen the video twice (high credibility) or had only 
read another participant’s memory report of the incident (low credibility). However, the 
manipulation checks revealed that the manipulation did not work as expected; participants 
rated their partner as being equally knowledgeable as they were in the low-credibility 
condition, although we had excluded participants if they either did not remember the 
credibility manipulation correctly or did not believe that the information came from a 
previous participant (see French, Garry, & Mori, 2011, who found that relative, not absolute, 
judgements of credibility influence how susceptible participants are to misinformation). 
Therefore, it was unsurprising that credibility did not significantly impact the error rates. As 
the manipulation check suggests that the manipulation itself did not work, the credibility 
conditions were collapsed for all statistical analyses (more information on the results is 
available on request; please contact the first author). In Experiment 3, only the high-
credibility condition was realised. 
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statistical software R was used to calculate exact tests, which are reported additionally if the 
conditions for z-Tests are not fully met, as well as 95% confidence intervals for the 
differences in proportions (R package ExactCIdiff). Please note that there may be rounding 
differences, especially for the differences calculated with the R package. All other statistical 
analyses were conducted with SPSS 21.0. In all three experiments, statistical tests are 
reported two-tailed, and, because of the multiple testing per research question, a Bonferroni 
correction was applied, resulting in an alpha level of .017. Furthermore, the alpha level was 
adjusted for additional analyses individually in each experiment. 
In Experiment 1, data from 115 participants were included. Table B1 (see main 
article) gives an overview of the error rates in the recognition task and of the errors that 
persisted in the SM task for the two items. The adjusted alpha level for additional analyses 
was .025. 
Baseline error. In the recognition task, the baseline error (control group) did not 
significantly differ between the central item (52.0%) and the peripheral item (48.0%), 
difference = 4.0%, 95% CI [-25.1, 32.5], z = -0.28, p = .781, h = -0.08, binomial test p = 
1.000. In the SM task, in contrast, the error rate slightly tended to be higher in the central 
item (52.0%) than in the peripheral item (20.0%), difference = 32.0%, 95% CI [2.4, 57.1], z = 
-2.14, p = .033, h = -0.61, binomial test p = .057. 
Recognition task. The chi-square test of independence conducted on the central item 
revealed a significant association between the three groups and the accuracy of the answer 
(correct/incorrect), χ2(2, N = 115) = 8.50, p = .014, ϕc = .27. Thus, column proportions of the 
different groups were compared (alpha level = .017). No significant misinformation effect 
was observed, as the comparison of the error rate in the control group (52.0%) and the 
misinformed and unwarned group (57.5%) was not significant, difference = 5.4%, 95% CI [-
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18.9, 30.6], z = 0.44, p = .658, h = 0.11. Nonetheless, the warning significantly reduced the 
error rate in the misinformed group from 57.4% to 27.9%, difference = 29.5%, 95% CI [8.5, 
48.9], z = 2.97, p = .003, h = 0.61. Although the difference between the control group 
(52.0%) and the misinformed and warned group (27.9%) failed to reach significance, the 
error rate was lower in the warned condition than in the control condition at a descriptive 
level, difference = 24.1%, 95% CI [-1.0, 47.1], z = -1.99, p = .047, h = -0.50.  
The test of independence for the peripheral item was not significant, χ2(2, N = 115) = 
1.93, p = .382, ϕc = .13, i.e., no statistically significant differences were observed in the error 
rates (control: 48.0%; misinformed and warned: 62.8%; misinformed and unwarned: 63.8%). 
Finally, the error rates in the central and the peripheral item in the misinformed groups 
were analysed. Participants committed significantly fewer errors with the central item 
(43.3%) than with the peripheral item (63.3%), difference = 20.0%, 95% CI [3.8, 34.9], z = 
2.65, p = .008, h = 0.40. 
SM task. The chi-square test of independence for both the central item and the 
peripheral item, failed to reach significance, χ2(2, N = 115) = 5.66, p = .059, ϕc = .22, and 
χ2(2, N = 115) = 1.12, p = .602, ϕc = .09, respectively (for the exact error rates in the different 
groups, see Table B1). Although not significant, the error rate in the central item was as much 
as 19.1% higher in the misinformed and unwarned than in the misinformed and warned 
group. 
The error rate in the central item (35.6%) and the peripheral item (26.7%) exhibited 
no significant difference in the collapsed misinformed groups, difference = 8.9%, 95% CI [-
6.1, 22.9], z = -1.26, p = .206, h = -0.20. Yet, it should be noted that the effect found with the 
recognition task was reversed at the descriptive level. 
Discussion 
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A significant misinformation effect was found for neither the central item nor the 
peripheral item in the recognition task. However, we could not exclude the possibility that a 
sampling error caused these results. This assumption was reinforced by the fact that the error 
rate in the central item was 24% higher in the control group than in the misinformed and 
warned group, although the difference narrowly failed to reach significance. Therefore, the 
impact of the warning on the error rate in the misinformed and unwarned group was also 
investigated. The warning was indeed found to reduce the error rate to half of its original 
size. No significant association between the three groups and the error rate was found with 
respect to the peripheral item. Thus, the results suggest that the warning reduced the error rate 
in the recognition task, but only for the central item. In other words, participants seem to have 
falsely reported the central item at least partially because of deliberation and/or the recency 
bias, whereas no such evidence was found for the peripheral item. 
No misinformation effect was observed for the SM task either. Furthermore, the effect 
of the warning found for the central item in the recognition task disappeared at a statistical 
level. Yet, the error rate still was as much as 19% higher in the misinformed and unwarned 
group than in the warned group. This finding may provide evidence that a warning and an 
SM task may––at least to some extent––affect different causes of false reports. But before 
examining this finding more closely, we wanted to test whether it was replicable. 
The frequency of false reports in the misinformed groups tended to be higher in the 
peripheral item than in the central item (difference of 20%). In the SM task, in contrast, the 
participants committed more errors in the central item, although only at a descriptive level. 
Hence, participants may have benefitted more from the opportunity to revise an incorrect 
answer in the peripheral item than in the central item.  
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These first results indicate that a substantial amount of false reports about the central 
critical aspect of the original event may be due to deliberation and/or the recency bias. For 
the peripheral item, a quite different picture emerged. As the warning had no error-reducing 
effect, errors due to deliberation and/or the recency bias probably do not underlie the false 
reports. Rather, the fact that participants––although only descriptively––benefit more from 
the SM task for the peripheral item than the central item suggests that a large proportion of 
the false reports about the peripheral item are due to best guesses or pure guesswork. 
The high baseline error of the central item in both the recognition task and the SM task 
suggests that this item might be quite susceptible to the development of false beliefs even in 
the absence of misinformation. Nearly half of the participants in the control condition 
believed that the victim had been kicked, although this was suggested neither in the video nor 
in the PEI. There are different possible explanations for this finding. First, as the item is 
rather schema-consistent, it may have been due to some kind of intrusion by activating the 
schema or script of a typical robbery. This activation may have resulted in a similar effect as 
in the Deese-Roediger-McDermott (DRM) paradigm (Roediger & McDermott, 1995; see also 
Roediger, Watson, McDermott, & Gallo, 2001). Second, the forced-choice recognition 
question could have suggested the presence of a kick to the participants, and participants 
readily developed a firm belief that this had actually happened. Third, the result may have 
been due to a sampling error. This last assumption receives some support from the 
descriptively lower error rate in the misinformed and warned group than in the control group. 
We also collected more data by running a posttest (N = 33 with a misinformed and unwarned 
group and a control group) for Experiment 1. The error rate was 12.5% in the control group 
(N = 16) and 64.7% in the misinformed and unwarned group (N = 17). Hence, we could not 
replicate the high error rate that was observed in the control group in Experiment 1. However, 
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having two contradictory results does not yet provide information on which of the two 
findings might have been due to a sampling error. 
Experiment 2 was designed to shed light on the causes of the high baseline error rate 
in the control condition as well as on the robustness of the findings from Experiment 1. To 
differentiate between the possible explanations for the high baseline error rate, additional 
open-ended questions were introduced prior to the recognition task. We reasoned that 
intrusions that occurred during the participants watched the video should be reported in open-
ended questions. By contrast, if the high baseline error were due to a possible suggestive 
effect of the recognition question, the error rate should be rather low in the open-ended 
questions but high in the recognition task. If, however, the high baseline error was merely a 
sampling error, it should not be replicated. As it cannot be excluded that the open-ended 
questions affect the possible suggestive effect of the recognition question, a second control 
group identical to that in Experiment 1 (no open-ended questions) was included. 
Experiment 2 
Method 
Participants. One hundred and eighty-six students participated in Experiment 2. 
Overall, 27 participants had to be excluded due to not remembering the warning (12), 
problems with the video presentation (2), disturbances during the video presentation (2), not 
believing at all that the information was actually generated by a former participant (4), or 
knowing the video already (7). The final groups consisted of 58 (misinformed and 
unwarned), 51 (misinformed and warned), 26 (control with open-ended questions), and 24 
(control without open-ended questions) participants. Mean age was M = 22.84 years (SD = 
3.41), 129 participants were women, and 34 participants were undergraduate psychology 
students. The other participants were students from other disciplines. 
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Design. The design of Experiment 2 was identical to that of Experiment 1, except for 
the second control group without open-ended questions, which was added as a replication of 
the control group from Experiment 1. In addition to the recognition and SM task, 
participants’ answers to the open-ended questions were analysed for the control groups 
(coded as critical item clearly mentioned: yes or no). 
Material and procedure. The material was identical to that of Experiment 1, except 
for three (two critical, one distractor) additional open-ended questions. The questions allowed 
participants to report the misinformation but were not suggestive. The question targeting the 
central item was: What kind of violence was exerted on the victim during the incident? Please 
describe the individual actions in more detail. This question is not considered to explicitly 
suggest the central misinformation (kick), because several other violent actions, such as being 
pushed against a wall, were exerted on the victim. The question targeting the peripheral item 
was: One of the perpetrators was not directly involved in the attack. Please describe his 
appearance and his clothing in detail. Two raters coded all answers as to whether or not the 
critical items (i.e., the kick in the stomach and/or the pulled-up hood) were clearly 
mentioned. Inter-rater agreement was 95% for both questions. Discrepancies between raters 
were discussed and resolved. 
The procedure was the same as in Experiment 1, except for the three additional open-
ended questions that were answered by all participants except for those in the second control 
group prior to the recognition task. In the warning condition, the warning was provided 
before the open-ended questions. 
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Results 
Data from 159 participants were included in statistical analyses (see Table B1 for an 
overview on the error rates in the different groups). The adjusted alpha level for additional 
analyses was .008. 
Baseline error. A first question of interest was whether the high baseline errors found 
in Experiment 1 were replicated. First, we tested whether the baseline errors were 
significantly different for the participants in the control groups with versus without the open-
ended questions. As no significant difference was observed (central item: 19.2% and 16.6%; 
difference = 2.6%, 95% CI [-20.6, 25.0], z = 0.24, p = .813, h = 0.07, Fisher’s Exact Test 
(FET) p = 1.000; peripheral item: 26.9% and 29.1%; difference = 2.2%, 95% CI [-22.4, 27.9], 
z = 0.18, p = .860, h = 0.05, FET p = 1.000), the data from the two control groups were 
collapsed for further analyses. Next, the error rates in the recognition task were compared for 
Experiment 1 and 2. In Experiment 2, the error rate was significantly lower for the central 
item (Experiment 1: 52.0%, Experiment 2: 18.0%; difference = 34.0%, 95% CI [11.2, 54.9], z 
= 2.99, p = .003, h = 0.73), whereas the difference failed to reach significance for the 
peripheral item (Experiment 1: 48.0%; Experiment 2: 28.0%; difference = 20.0%, 95% CI 
[3.2, 42.9], z = 1.69, p = .091, h = 0.42). As in Experiment 1, the central item (18.0%) and the 
peripheral item (28.0%) did not differ significantly in their error rate for the recognition task, 
difference = 10.0%, 95% CI [-5.7, 25.9], z = 1.29, p = .197, h = 0.34, FET p = .302. For the 
SM task, participants in the control group slightly tended to commit more errors in the central 
item (18.0%) than the peripheral item (4.0%), difference = 14.0%, 95% CI [2.2, 27.1], z = -
2.30, p = .022, h = -0.89, binomial test p = .039, although the difference clearly failed to 
reach significance with the exact test. 
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Recognition task. As in Experiment 1, the three groups and the accuracy of the 
answers to the central item were associated significantly, χ2(2, N = 159) = 15.80, p < .001, ϕc 
= .32. Individual comparisons revealed a misinformation effect, as the error rate increased 
significantly from 18.0% in the control group to 53.4% in the misinformed and unwarned 
group, difference = 35.4%, 95% CI [11.0, 52.1], z = 4.17, p < .001, h = 0.76. The warning not 
only reduced the error rate from 53.4% to 29.4%, difference = 24.0%, 95% CI [4.0, 45.6], z = 
2.63, p = .009, h = 0.49; the misinformation effect was even eliminated statistically 
(misinformed and warned: 29.4%, control: 18.0%; z = 1.36, p = .173, h = 0.27), although a 
difference of 11.4%, 95% CI [-8.7, 30.6], remained. 
For the peripheral item too, a significant association was found between the groups 
and the commission of an error, χ2(2, N = 159) = 38.84, p < .001, ϕc = .49. There was a 
significant misinformation effect (increase from 28.0% to 82.8%; difference = 54.8%, 95% 
CI [38.0, 70.1], z = 6.80, p < .001, h = 1.17). In contrast to the central item, the warning did 
not significantly reduce the error rate for the peripheral item (decrease from 82.7% to 74.5%; 
difference = 8.2%, 95% CI [-7.9, 25.8], z = 1.05, p = .294, h = 0.20), and the error rate 
remained significantly higher in the misinformed and warned group (74.5%) than in the 
control group (28.0%), difference = 46.5%, 95% CI [27.4, 62.7], z = 5.28, p < .001, h = 0.97. 
Over the two misinformed groups, participants committed significantly fewer errors 
with the central item (42.2%) than with the peripheral item (78.9%), difference = 36.7%, 95% 
CI [24.0, 48.2], z = 5.35, p < .001, h = 0.80. 
SM task. Here too, a significant association was found between the groups and false 
reports of the central misinformation, χ2(2, N = 159) = 12.65, p = .002, ϕc = .28. The 
misinformation effect (increase from 18.0% to 48.3%) and the effect of the warning (decrease 
from 48.3% to 25.5%) were both significant, difference = 30.3%, 95% CI [7.3, 46.8], z = 
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3.55, p < .001, h = 0.66, and difference = 22.8%, 95% CI [2.8, 43.9], z = 2.54, p = .011, h = 
0.48, respectively. As in the recognition task, no significant difference between the 
misinformed and warned group (25.5%) and the control group (18.0%) was detected, 
difference = 7.5%, 95% CI [-12.2, 23.9], z = 0.92, p = .359, h = 0.18. 
The significant association also persisted in the peripheral item, χ2(2, N = 159) = 
11.24, p = .004, ϕc = .27. A misinformation effect remained (increase from 4.0% to 27.6%; 
difference = 23.6%, 95% CI [8.5, 37.3], z = 3.63, p < .001, h = 0.70, FET p = .001), the 
warning had no significant impact on the error rate (decrease from 27.6% to 25.5%; 
difference = 2.1%, 95% CI [-15.9, 20.0], z = 0.25, p = .804, h = 0.05), and the misinformation 
effect was also found in the misinformed and warned group (increase from 4.0% to 25.5%; 
difference = 21.5%, 95% CI [8.0, 36.2], z = 3.21, p = .001, h = 0.66, FET p = .004). 
Other than in the recognition task, no significant difference was observed between the 
error rate in the central (37.6%) and the peripheral item (26.6%), difference = 11.0%, 95% CI 
[-2.0, 23.4], z = -1.73, p = .083, h = -0.25. although the effect was reversed at the descriptive 
level, as was the case in Experiment 1. 
Open-ended questions. The open-ended questions were introduced to examine the 
occurrence of intrusions in the control group. A kick (suggested central item) was mentioned 
by two (7.7%) of the control-group participants, and one person (3.8%) was unsure whether 
the victim was kicked. No participant spontaneously mentioned the pulled-up hood 
(suggested peripheral item). 
Discussion 
In contrast to Experiment 1, a distinct misinformation effect was found in Experiment 
2 for both items in the recognition task. Concerning the central item, the main reason for this 
finding was the lower baseline error in the control group. For the peripheral item, the 
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combination of a lower baseline error and a higher error rate in the misinformed group 
without a warning was responsible for the effect. As in Experiment 1, a significant warning 
effect was found for the central item but not for the peripheral item, and the misinformation 
effect was even eliminated; the difference in the error rate between the misinformed group 
with a warning and the control group was not significant. By contrast, the misinformation 
effect in the peripheral item was observed in both misinformed groups. 
Both the misinformation effect and the warning effect for the central item persisted in 
the SM task. The finding that the error rate was nearly 23% higher in the misinformed and 
unwarned group than in the misinformed and warned group suggests that a warning may 
reduce some causes of false reports that are not captured by the SM task. If the error-reducing 
effect of the warning were caused by the same reasons as those of the SM task, the warning 
effect should not persist in the unwarned group when the error rate observed in the SM task is 
considered. One possible explanation is that answering the recognition questions activates the 
original event and the misinformation at the same time. This joint activation may foster false 
beliefs at a later stage (Zaragoza & Lane, 1994), possibly independently even of whether the 
initial answer was correct or not (see e.g., Ackil & Zaragoza, 1998, who found that 
participants develop false memories even for forced fabrications). This possibility was 
explored in Experiment 3 (see below). 
In the recognition task, the error rate in the misinformed groups was 37% higher in the 
peripheral item than in the central item. Again, the effect was reversed at a descriptive level 
in the SM task. Hence, as in Experiment 1, the chance to revise an incorrect answer seems to 
be used more for the peripheral item than for the central item. Overall, the results of 
Experiment 2 support those of Experiment 1; the causes of false reports seem to be quite 
different for the central item and the peripheral item. According to our findings, the former 
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seems to be mainly, if not entirely, due to deliberation or the recency bias, whereas in the 
latter best-guess errors and pure guesswork seem to have a substantial share. 
The results of Experiment 2 also give some indication of what may have caused the 
high baseline error in Experiment 1. As the high error rate was replicated in neither of the 
two control groups and as the error rate was significantly lower in Experiment 2 than in 
Experiment 1, a sampling error seems to be a plausible explanation. The results from the 
posttest additionally support this conclusion. Furthermore, although some spontaneous 
intrusions, meaning a development of false beliefs in the absence of misinformation, occurred 
in the answers to the open-ended questions, they were rather rare. 
The aims of Experiment 3 were twofold. First, we wanted to know whether main 
results of the first two experiments could be replicated with a sample from another university 
in another country. Second, we sought a better understanding of why the significant effect of 
a warning persisted in the SM task for the central item. To test the idea that the mere act of 
elaborating on the recognition question (independently of the final answer participants arrive 
at) may sometimes foster false beliefs, we explored whether some participants would switch 
from an initially correct answer in the recognition task to accepting the misinformation in the 
SM task if they had the opportunity. As such a shift was not possible in the SM task we had 
used so far, a new version of the SM task was added in Experiment 3. 
Experiment 3 
Method 
Participants. In Experiment 3, 162 participants were tested. Overall, 40 of them had 
to be excluded due to not remembering the warning (10), problems with the video 
presentation (5), disturbances during the video presentation or major interruptions during the 
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experiment (12)9, or not believing at all that the information was actually generated by a 
former participant (13). The final groups consisted of 26 (misinformed and unwarned, old 
SM task), 26 (misinformed and unwarned, new SM task), 20 (misinformed and warned, old 
SM task), 24 (misinformed and warned, new SM task), and 26 (control, old SM task) 
participants. Mean age was M = 22.27 years (SD = 3.95), 96 participants were women, and 
only 3 participants were not undergraduate psychology students. Data were collected at a 
university abroad.  
Design. The design of Experiment 3 was identical to Experiment 1. One warned and 
one unwarned group worked though the new SM task, whereas the other three groups 
completed the old SM task. All groups were included in the statistical analyses of the 
recognition task; the results of the SM task were examined separately according to the old 
and new measurement. 
Material and procedure. Beyond the SM version used in the former two experiments 
(old SM task), a new version (new SM task) was introduced in this experiment. In this new 
task, participants read statements such as “The victim was kicked when he was lying on the 
ground” (includes the misinformation on the central aspect),“The ‘passive’ perpetrator wore 
a hood pulled over his head” (includes the misinformation on the peripheral aspect), or “The 
‘passive’ perpetrator was clean-shaven” (refers to a comparison item). For each statement, 
participants had to decide on a scale with the anchors 1 NO, certainly not, 5 unsure, and 9 
YES, certainly whether the statement corresponded (a) to what they had seen in the video, and 
(b) to what their partner had reported (see Chambers & Zaragoza, 2001, for a similar 
                                            
9 For instance, four participants had to be excluded due to a fire practice, another four 
because of an interruption while they were watching the video. 
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approach). Apart from the two experimental groups that completed the new instead of the old 
SM task, the procedure and the material were identical to that of Experiment 1. 
Results 
Data from 122 participants were included in statistical analyses. For an overview of 
error rates in the different groups, see Table B1. The adjusted alpha level for additional 
analyses was .025. 
Baseline error. The baseline error in the recognition task did not differ significantly 
between the central item (15.4%) and the peripheral item (34.6%), difference = 19.2%, 95% 
CI [-3.6, 41.8], z = 1.67, p = .096, h = 0.59, binomial test p = .180. The same applied to the 
SM task with 11.5% (central item) and 15.4% (peripheral item), difference = 3.8%, 95% CI [-
15.1, 23.7], z = 0.45, p = .655, h = 0.20, binomial test p = 1.000. 
Recognition task. As in the former experiments, a significant association was 
observed between the groups and the error rate in the central item, χ2(2, N = 122) = 14.40, p = 
.001, ϕc = .34. Individual comparisons revealed a significant misinformation effect (increase 
from 15.4% to 57.7%; difference = 42.3%, 95% CI [20.2, 59.9], z = 4.30, p < .001, h = 0.92, 
FET p = .001). However, no significant effect of a warning was found this time (decrease 
from 57.7% to 56.8%; difference = 0.9%, 95% CI [-20.1, 22.7], z = 0.09, p = .931, h = 0.02), 
and the misinformation effect was not eliminated in the warned group (difference = 41.4%, 
95% CI [19.0, 59.9], z = 4.03, p < .001, h = 0.90, FET p = .001). 
The association was also significant for the peripheral item, χ2(2, N = 122) = 11.77, p 
= .003, ϕc = .31. The error rate was significantly higher in the misinformed and unwarned 
(73.1%) than in the control group (34.6%), difference = 38.5%, 95% CI [14.6, 58.3], z = 3.44, 
p = .001, h = 0.79. As in the other experiments, the warning did not significantly reduce the 
error rate in the peripheral item (decrease from 73.1% to 68.2%; difference = 4.9%, 95% CI 
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[-14.1, 24.6], z = 0.52, p = .600, h = 0.11), and the error rate was significantly higher in the 
misinformed and warned group (68.2%) than in the control group (34.6%), difference = 
33.6%, 95% CI [9.2, 55.3], z = 2.87, p = .004, h = 0.68. 
Overall, participants committed fewer errors with the central item (57.3%) than with 
the peripheral item (70.8%) in the misinformed groups at a descriptive level, difference = 
13.5%, 95% CI [-0.8, 27.6], z = 1.86, p = .063, h = 0.27. 
SM task. For these analyses, only the old SM task was considered. As with the 
recognition task, a significant association was found between the groups and the central item, 
χ2(2, N = 72) = 12.82, p = .002, ϕc = .42. The misinformation effect persisted (increase from 
11.5% to 53.8%; difference = 42.3%, 95% CI [17.4, 63.0], z = 3.64, p < .001, h = 0.95, FET p 
= .003), and, as with the recognition task, the warning had no effect (increase from 53.8% to 
55.0%; difference = 1.2%, 95% CI [-28.0, 30.8], z = -0.08, p = .938, h = -0.02, FET p = 
1.000). The error rate was significantly higher in the misinformed and warned group (55.0%) 
than in the control group (11.5%), difference = 43.5%, 95% CI [15.0, 66.9], z = 3.40, p < 
.001, h = 0.98, FET p = .003. For the peripheral item, the chi-square test was not significant, 
χ2(2, N = 72) = 4.89, p = .087, ϕc = .26, FET p = 1.000. 
In contrast to the recognition task, the error rate was significantly higher for the 
central item (54.3%) than the peripheral item (23.9%), difference = 30.4%, 95% CI [9.9, 
49.7], z = -2.86, p = .004, h = -0.62, binomial test p = .007. 
New source monitoring. The new SM task was introduced to check whether 
participants sometimes come to believe that they saw the suggested item in the original event 
although they had answered the recognition question correctly. The criterion for such a 
change was that participants select a value of 6 or more on the 9-point Likert scale, which 
means that they think they may remember the misinformation from the video. For the central 
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item, none of the 26 participants who answered the recognition question correctly 
(misinformed warned and unwarned groups collapsed) changed his/her mind. With the 
peripheral item, only one (7.7%) out of the 13 participants altered his/her view and indicated 
that he/she might have seen the pulled-up hood in the video. 
Discussion 
The misinformation effect found in Experiment 2 was replicated in Experiment 3 for 
both items in the recognition task. In contrast to Experiments 1 and 2, however, the warning 
effect could not be corroborated for the central item. Thus, no evidence was found that the 
false reports of the central item were at least partially due to deliberation or the recency bias. 
We compared the sample from Experiment 3 with the other two samples, but we could not 
find any differences that would have explained this finding, in our opinion. It is possible that 
the effect did not occur because of a sampling error or because the warning has different 
effects in different populations.10 As a logical consequence of finding a misinformation effect 
but no warning effect, the misinformation effect was also observed in the misinformed and 
warned group in both items. While the misinformation effect persisted in the SM task for the 
central item, it failed to reach significance for the peripheral item, even though the error rate 
was nearly twice as high in the misinformed and unwarned group as in the control group. 
What could be replicated is the finding that the error rates for the two items differ 
depending on the memory task that is considered. The error rate was descriptively higher in 
the peripheral item when the recognition task was considered, but this was reversed in the 
                                            
10 The fact that the low-credibility condition (see footnote 1) was not realised in this study is 
most probably not an explanation, as the warning effect was not systematically stronger in the 
low-credibility than in the high-credibility condition. 
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SM task, with participants committing over 30% more errors with the central item than the 
peripheral item. Hence, the results corroborate the assumption that the reasons for false 
reports are quite different for the peripheral and central items despite the warning having no 
effect in this case. 
Finally, analyses of the new SM task did not provide evidence that participants 
change their mind after a correct recognition decision. Thus, answering the recognition task 
did not seem to foster source misattributions in general, at least not after a short delay of a 
couple of minutes at most. Therefore, the surprising warning effect in the SM task found in 
Experiment 2 (and by trend also in Experiment 1) still demands further explanation. We will 
return to this in the Discussion in the main article. 
Considering the three experiments, it becomes clear that the results were not always 
unanimous. This may at least partially be explained by the statistical methods and the rather 
low power associated with them. We therefore collapsed the data from the three experiments 
for the overall analysis, which is reported in the main article. This allows a more precise and 
robust estimate of the actual effects. 
Were the differences between the experiments due to sampling error? 
The data from the three experiments were more closely analysed in order to assess 
whether the differences between the experiments were due to sampling errors.  
Method 
To examine this question, we used an approach that compares multiple contingency 
tables as described by Bortz, Lienert, and Boehnke (2008, pp. 158–159). More precisely, we 
tested whether the combinations of the different categories occurred comparably often in the 
samples from the different experiments. Our data results in 6x3 tables. Six because there 
were three conditions per experiment and in each condition the answer to the critical question 
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could be correct or incorrect (3x2 = 6), and three because the data from the three experiments 
were compared. Overall, there were 4 of these 6x3 tables: one for the central item with the 
recognition task, one for the central item with the SM task, one for the peripheral item with 
the recognition task, and one for the peripheral item with the SM task. Please note that the 
data from post-test 1 was added on the data from Experiment 1 as the comparison only works 
for studies with identical conditions.  
Results 
 The Bonferroni correction resulted in a critical p value of .013. None of the outcomes 
of the homogeneity analysis reached significance (central item, recognition task: χ2(10, N = 
429) = 21.47, p = .018, ϕc = .07; central item, SM task: χ2(10, N = 379) = 16.00, p = .100, ϕc 
= .06; peripheral item, recognition task: χ2(10, N = 429) = 11.23, p = .340, ϕc = .05; 
peripheral item, SM task: χ2(10, N = 379) = 10.42, p = .404, ϕc = .05). 
Discussion 
 For the central item in the recognition task a tendency towards significant 
differences between the experiments was observed. The high chi-square value was mainly 
due to the higher number of errors in Experiment 3 compared to Experiments 1 and 2 for the 
misinformed and warned group (which is why no warning effect was observed in Experiment 
3). It is worth discussing the failure to replicate the warning effect in Experiment 3, as this 
study was run at another university in another country (for further comments on this issue, 
see the main manuscript). With respect to the absence of a misinformation effect in 
Experiment 1, we conclude that this was probably due to a sampling error. 
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